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l. INTRODUCTION 
The United States does not have a clearly articulated court-access 
policy for cases involving foreign parties. As a result, federal judges 
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make vastly inconsistent decisions about when to d_ismiss a cas~ in 
favor of a foreign forum and when to go forward With the case m a 
u.s. court. Judges' unarticulated assumptions about their gatekeeping 
role in controlling court access, combined with their largely unreview-
able discretion in making those forum-access decisions, have created a 
highly inefficient forum-selection system. 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, which drives much of the 
current inefficiency, can be stated much more easily than it can be 
applied. 1 Under the doctrine, a district court possesses discretion to 
dismiss a case if (1) there is another forum that is both adequate and 
available to hear the case; and (2) both the public interest2 and the 
parties' private interests3 weigh in favor of having the case heard by 
the alternate forum. In practice, the doctrine causes innumerable 
headaches to judges and litigants dealing with transnational cases. 
Scholars and litigators alike have criticized courts for applying the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine in ways that are unpredictable, chaotic, 
and markedly different from one court to another.4 
Many proposals have been offered to solve the problem. A num-
ber of these proposals offer ways to refine and better articulate the 
interests that the forum non conveniens doctrine protects.5 Other pro-
l. See GARY B. BoRN & PETER B. RuTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES CouRTs 369 (4th ed. 2007) ("Perhaps because it is a catchy Latin phrase, the 
forum non conveniens doctrine appears deceptively easy to comprehend."). 
2. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (identifying the public interest 
factors as "the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the 'local interest in 
having localized controversies decided at home'; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case 
in a forum that is at home with the law that must _govern the action; the avoidance of unneces-
sary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign law; and the unfairness of 
burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty"). 
3. ld. (identifying the private interest factors as "the 'relative ease of access to sources of 
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining 
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to 
the action: and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 
inexpensive'"). 
4. See, e.g., Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 
77 TuL. L. REv. 309, 352-53 (2002); see also M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang 
Litigation: How Convenienr Is Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 B.Y.U. 
INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 21, 51 (2007). 
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non 
Conveniens, 41 U.C. DAvrs L. REv. 559, 602-03 (2007); Note, Cross-Jurisdictional Forum Non 
Conveniens Preclusion, 121 HARV. L. REv. 2178, 2195-99 (2008); Emily J. Derr, Note, Striking a 
Beuer Public-Private Balance in Forum Non Conveniens, 93 CoRNELL L. REv. 819, 841-48 
(2008); Finity E. Jernigan, Note, Forum Non Conveniens: Whose Convenience and Justice?, 86 
TEXAs L. REv. 1079, 1120-21 (2008); Leah Nico, Note, From Local to Global: Reform of Forum 
Non Conveniens Needed to Ensure Justice in the Era of Globalization, 11 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 
345, 360-62 (2005). 
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posals focus on institutional choice, suggesting that the other branches 
of government-particularly Congress-should take a larger role in 
setting court-access policy in general.6 A few commentators have rec-
ommended heightening the standard of review applied to forum non 
conveniens decisions.7 
While each of these substantive proposals would go a long way 
toward resolving the current uncertainty and inefficiency-and any of 
these proposals would be preferable to the current morass8-none of 
these proposals is likely to be effective without corresponding proce-
dural protections. The fundamental inconsistency in how judges apply 
the forum non conveniens doctrine cannot be eliminated unless appel-
late courts are able to review district court decisions to deny forum 
non conveniens motions as well as decisions to grant them. Although 
the Supreme Court has held that forum non conveniens decisions are 
not subject to interlocutory review as a matter of right,9 such a right 
could still be created outside the common-law process. Ideally, Con-
6. See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens 
in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and A Proposal for A Uniform Standard. 28 
TEx. lNT'L L.J. 501, 524-25 (1993) ("The clearest and most direct solution. however. would be 
the enactment of a federal statute, limiting access to United States courts to foreign plaintiffs 
seeking relief for claims that arise outside of the United States. Such a statute would reflect not 
only the traditional procedural concerns of forum non conveniens but also the avowedly substan-
tive aspects of an international relations law."): see also Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transna-
tional Litigarion and Institlllional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1081, 1131 (2010) ("Reform will be 
best accomplished when all three branches take an active role: Congress in articulating an initial 
court-access policy, the executive branch in negotiating bilateral treaties and multilateral court-
access conventions, and the judiciary in applying these policies to individual cases."); Stephen B. 
Burbank. Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National 
Law, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 203,245 (2001) ("[L]egislation could dispose of doubts about the legiti-
macy of forum non conveniens dismissals under certain federal regulatory statutes. Congress 
could do so simply by enumerating the federal statutory claims, if any, to which the doctrine 
could not be applied. Alternatively and probably preferably, Congress could articulate the rele-
vance of regulatory interest, broadly defined, to the analysis and thus perhaps influence the 
development of doctrine in areas not formally reached by its commands."): Peter J. Carney, 
International Forum Non Conveniens: "Section 1404.5" -A Proposal in the Interest of Sover-
eigmy, Comity, and Individual Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 415, 464 (1995) ("Codification carries 
the advantage of uniformity among the circuits and the prevention of courts clinging to old or 
different standards for dismissal."). 
7. Andrew R. Klein, Foreign Plaintiffs, Forum non Conveniens, and Consistency, in SE-
LECTED EssAYS ON CuRRENT LEGAL IssuEs 193 (David Frenkel & Carsten Gerner-Beuerle 
eds .. 2008) (advocating de novo review on appeal); Nicholas A. Fromherz, A Call for Stricter 
Appellate Review of Decisions on Forum Non Conveniens, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUmEs L. 
REv._ (2012) (forthcoming) available at http://works.bepress.com/nicholas_fromherz/l/. 
8. See infra Part I. 
9. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988). Shortly after Supreme Court 
foreclosed collateral- order review, one commentator urged Congress to adopt a statutory right 
of interlocutory review for both forum non conveniens and venue transfer decisions. See 
Christina Melady Morin, Review and Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens and Venue Transfer 
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gress should adopt a statute that articulates both the substantive pol-
icy and the procedural protections of the doctrine. In the absence of 
such a statute, the federal rulemaking process, however, could at least 
provide a right of interlocutory review. 10 In the meantime, the district 
courts and appellate courts may and should liberally certify individual 
cases for interlocutory appeal. 11 
II. THE NEED FOR GREATER UNIFORMITY IN FoRUM NoN 
CoNVENIENs 
For decades, scholars have decried the fact that the forum non 
conveniens doctrine, at least as applied by federal courts within the 
United States, lacks coherence and fails to offer predictable results. 
The doctrine has been described as a "crazy quilt of ad hoc, capri-
cious, and inconsistent decisions. "12 Court decisions have not offered 
much solace: even the Supreme Court has stated that the degree of a 
district court's discretion and the number of factors to be considered 
"make uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible" 
and mean that parties cannot rely on the doctrine to determine 
"where to sue or where one is subject to being sued."13 This lack of 
predictability takes a significant toll on litigants in transnational cases. 
A. Litigation Inefficiency 
A great deal of time and money is spent litigating over forum 
choice. The effort expended by parties litigating this issue is grossly 
disproportional to the actual amount of transnational litigation in U.S. 
courts.14 The skewed distribution may be explained by the "80/20 
Rule," a heuristic derived from economist Vilfredo Pareto's 1896 hy-
Orders, 59 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 715 (1991). Congress failed to do so, and the problems associ-
ated with a lack of effective interlocutory review have only grown in the last two decades. 
10. 28 U.S.C. 1292(e) (2006) ("The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with 
section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of 
appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d)."). 
11. Interlocutory review may be available by mandamus or through 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) in 
exceptional cases. See infra Part IV.B. 
12. Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 
133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 785 (1985). 
13. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller. 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994). 
14. In the calendar year 2011, there were approximately 200 judicial opinions analyzing a 
transnational forum non conveniens challenge, as shown by a Westlaw search for opinions con-
taining at least four instances of the phrase "forum non conveniens." While transnational cases 
still comprise a small percentage of the number of cases filed in federal court, see Christopher A. 
Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CoRNELL L. REv. 481, 529 (2011) 
("[T]he decline of alienage litigation raises substantial doubts about the claim that the United 
States is experiencing a transnational litigation explosion."), the number of forum non con-
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pothesis of an "extreme distribution ... whereby a relatively small 
proportion of elements generates a large proportion of distribution."15 
In the case of forum non conveniens, the disproportionality results 
from two salient characteristics of the current doctrine: first, its nearly 
dispositive effect on the ultimate outcome of the case; and second, its 
inconsistency within and among the federal circuits. As a result, the 
resources expended in litigation over forum choice may even exceed 
the resources expended in litigating the merits of many transnational 
disputes. 16 
For foreign plaintiffs in particular, a U.S. court is often the only 
effective forum; loser-pay rules, lower damages, and the lack of con-
tingency fees in many other countries may preclude re-filing in an-
other country if the U.S. court dismisses the suitY Even if the plaintiff 
refiles elsewhere, the defendant may resist enforcement of the foreign 
judgment despite having successfully procured a dismissal in favor of 
that foreign forum. 18 Because dismissal often ends the case, defend-
ants have historically had a strong incentive to file a forum non con-
veniens motion irt nearly every case with a plausible alternative forum, 
and plaintiffs have likewise had a strong incentive to fight strongly 
against dismissal. Thus, both parties are motivated to zealously con-
test the forum non conveniens issue at the district court level. 
When the parties litigate forum non conveniens, they have no 
shortage of issues to argue about; the doctrine is highly unsettled, with 
intercircuit and intracircuit cont1icts on a large number of issues. Two 
veniens dismissals appears to growing. See Donald Earl Childress IlL When Erie Goes Interna-
tional, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 37, 46). 
15. Mira Burri-Nenova. Trade versus Culture in the Digital Environment: An Old Conflict in 
Need of a New Definition. 12 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 17, 62 (2009). 
16. See Barry Friedman & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fragmemation of the Federal Rules, 79 
JumcATURE 67, 70 (1995) ("The more two sides in a lawsuit see the costs or outcome depending 
on the district where the case is litigated, the more there will be fights over venue and 
jurisdiction."). 
17. Victor Manual Diaz, Jr., quoted in John F. Molloy, Miami Conference Summary of 
Presentations, 20 ARIZ. J. lNT'L & CaMP. LAw 47, 93 (stating tbat an Italian law professor's 
empirical study had found that "ninety-nine percent of cases dismissed on forum non conveniens 
grounds in the United States, are, for one reason or another, never refiled. Thus, the fact is that 
the forum non conveniens dismissal is, in most instances, a dispositive dismissal of the litiga-
tion."); David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather Fan-
tastic Fiction", 103 L.Q. REv. 398, 418-20 (1987) (also finding that many dismissed cases are 
never refiled); bw see Robertson, Transnational Litigation and !J1Slitwional Choice, supra note 6 
(noting that other countries are beginning to encourage the refiling of such cases in the plaintiffs' 
home forum). 
18. See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens 
and the En.forcemenl of Foreign Judgments, 111 CoLUM. L. REv. 1444. 1447 (2011). 
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recent scholars have attempted to catalogue these inconsistencies, not-
ing that current conflicts include: 
1. Disagreement about whether to "consider whether the 
United States' judgment is enforceable abroad" or "whether 
a judgment acquired in the alternative jurisdiction would be 
enforceable in the United States";19 
2. Differing policies about whether to consider the public inter-
est factors at all when the private interest factors weigh in 
favor of dismissal;2° 
3. Disagreement about whether to compare "the interests of the 
foreign forum" with the interest of the U.S. forum;21 
4. Differing analyses of docket congestion, as some courts will 
provide a comparative analysis of congestion, while others 
will consider only "the absolute congestion of their own court 
dockets";22 
5. Different weight given to the role of relevant treaties, includ-
ing the former Warsaw Convention23 various treaties of 
"Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation" that contain open-
court provisions,24 and the International Covenant on Civii 
and Political Rights;25 
19. M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient Is Forum 
Non Conveniens in Transnational Licigacion?, 4 B.Y.U. lNT'L L. & MoMT. REv. 21, 25 n.15 
(2007) (comparing Scottish Air Int'l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Group, PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 1233 
(2d Cir. 1996) with Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824. 836 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
20. !d. ("The Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits do not consider the public interest factors at 
all if the private interest factors indicate that the case should be dismissed, while all the other 
circuits give equal weight to each category."). 
21. !d. (citing SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A., 382 F.3d 1097, 
1101-05 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
22. !d. (comparing Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 609 (lOth Cir. 1998) with 
Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
23. !d. (comparing Trivelloni-Lorenzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Crash 
Disaster), 821 F.2d 1147, 1160-62 (5th Cir. 1987) with Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 
989. 1004 (9th Cir. 2002) ). 
24. Allan Jay Stevenson, Forum Non Conveniens and Equal Access Under Friendship, Com-
nzerce, and Navigation Treaties: A Foreign Plaintiffs Rights. 13 HAsTINGS lNT'L & CoMP. L. 
REv. 267, 267 (1990): see also Irish Nat'! Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 
1984); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products Liability Litig., 190 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1136 
(S.D. Ind. 2002) (holding that the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation and Commerce be-
tween the United States and Venezuela provides "expatriate U.S. nationals and treaty nationals 
residing in their home countries ... the same preference of their choice of forum, with the 
consideration that suing in a United States forum while residing in a foreign country is less likely 
to be convenient"). 
25. Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
plaintiffs had unsuccessfully "invoke[ d) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" 
to argue against forum non conveniens dismissal). 
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6. Inconsistent analysis regarding whether a potential alterna-
tive forum should be considered "available" to the litigants.26 
In addition to these conflicts in the law of forum non conveniens, 
there is also uncertainty about whether the Erie doctrine would re-
quire federal courts to apply state forum non conveniens law.27 And 
finally, a new conflict has recently arisen: whether an action filed to 
enforce an arbitration award can be subject to dismissal for forum non 
conveniens. Although the majority view is that the New York Conven-
tion prohibits such dismissals, the Second Circuit has recently held to 
the contrary and ordered the dismissal of a party's attempt to enforce 
an arbitration award. 28 
Given the strong incentive of both parties to fight vigorously over 
forum choice, and given the number of conflicts surrounding the doc-
trine, it is no surprise that the parties find plenty of ammunition with 
which to battle over forum choice. As a result, defendants file a forum 
non conveniens motion in nearly every case involving foreign parties, 
and the court must therefore take the time to work through all the 
arguments involved in that motion.29 
26. Casey & Ristoph, supra note 19. at 25 n.15 (comparing Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Over-
seas. Ltd .. 52 F.3d 1220. 1227 (3d Cir. 1995) with Leon v. Millon Air. Inc .. 251 F.3d1305. 1311-12 
(11th Cir. 2001)). 
27. Apotex Corp. v.lstituto Biologico Chemioterapico S.p.a., 02 C 5345. 2003 WL 21780965 
(N.D. Ill. July 30, 2003) ("There appears to be a conflict between the circuits on the question 
whether forum non conveniens is governed by federal or state law in a diversity case.") (compar-
ing Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193, 195 (2d Cir.l945) (state law). with Rivendell Forest Prods .. Ltd. 
v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 992 (lOth Cir.1993) (federal law); Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. 
Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis, Ltd., 906 F.2d 45, 50 (1st Cir.1990)(federal law); and 
In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1159 (5th Cir.1987) (en bane) 
(federal law)). See also 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT et a/ .. Federal Practice and Procedure 
§3828.5 (2007) ("In determining the appropriate law for deciding the forum non conveniens 
motion, the Supreme Court repeatedly has declined to decide whether state notions of forum 
non conveniens are binding on a federal court in a diversity of citizenship action."); Stephen B. 
Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibrarion: Paths to A Via Media?, 26 
Hous. J. lNT'L L. 385, 404 n.30 (2004) (expressing doubt that federal forum non conveniens law 
should be applied in diversity cases). 
28. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, No. 09-3925-CV 
L. 2011 WL 6188497 (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 2011). 
29. Walter W. Heiser. Forum Non Conveniens and RetaliaTOry Legislation: The Impact on 
the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non Conveniens as a 
Defense Tactic, 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 609 (2008) ("A motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non 
conveniens has become the primary response of domestic defendants to tort actions brought by 
foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts.''); Russell J. Weintraub. flllemational Litigation and Forum Non 
Conveniens. 29 TEx. lNT'L L..l. 321. 322 (1994). 
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Overall, the dismissal rate for forum non conveniens is just over 
half-that is, similar to the success rate of predicting a coin toss.30 
When the case involves foreign plaintiffs and arises out of the activi-
ties of U.S. corporate defendants in the plaintiffs' home country, 
courts will usually-but certainly not always-dismiss the case in 
favor of litigation in the plaintiffs' home forum. 31 
In addition to taking up a disproportionate amount of time at the 
district court level, this skewed distribution carries over into appellate 
proceedings. The unsettled nature of the doctrine means that the same 
arguments made in the district courts will likely be made again on 
appeal. If and when the defendant wins dismissal, the plaintiff will 
almost certainly attempt to overturn that dismissal on appeal. Given 
the number of intercircuit and intracircuit splits on fundamental as-
pects of the doctrine,32 a colorable basis for appeal will exist in nearly 
every case dismissed for forum non conveniens. As a result, parties 
will have every incentive to zealously pursue an appeal. 
B. Regulatory Inefficiency 
In addition to the forum non conveniens doctrine's litigation inef-
ficiency, which increases costs borne by parties and courts, the doc-
trine also suffers from a regulatory inefficiency that increases costs to 
the economy more broadly. The balance between litigation and regu-
lation is a delicate one, and raising the overall cost of litigation 
through multiple forum non conveniens proceedings can have a corre-
sponding effect on national and international regulatory policies.33 
The regulatory problem begins at the level of the individual actor. 
The Supreme Court may be right to conclude that the doctrine as cur-
rently formulated cannot effectively guide secondary conduct in litiga-
30. See Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum in the 
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 513, 523 (2009). 
31. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CoRNELL L. 
REv. 481, 522 (2011); see also Heiser, supra note 29, at 609 (noting that courts will grant such a 
motion in "nearly every case") but compare In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 
1125, 1156 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (retaining jurisdiction over tire-defect rollover cases brought by 
Venezulan plaintiffs). Other rollover cases-even some involving the same defendants-were 
dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See, e.g., Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 
F. Supp. 2d 672, 682-83 (S.D. Tex. 2004); Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 
672 (5th Cir. 2003). 
32. See supra notes 19-28. 
33. See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on 
Transnational Litigation, 44 CAsE WEs. REs. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012) available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1966202. 
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tion,34 but the doctrine may nevertheless guide primary conduct in the 
marketplace, albeit inefficiently and ineffectively.35 One scholar has 
pointed out that the doctrine's uncertainty makes it more likely that 
"an outlying jurisdiction's policies [might] drive the conduct of a party 
that operates throughout the country, if not the world."36 When mul-
tinational companies estimate litigation costs, they must prepare for a 
worst-case scenario-what is the most expensive, least convenient fo-
rum in which they may be called to defend?37 Even if only some 
courts within a particular forum will accept the case while most would 
dismiss it, companies may well structure their conduct to avoid even 
the possibility of being subject to suit in an undesired forum?8 
If parties could make a more accurate prediction regarding the 
likelihood of standing trial in the United States, they could structure 
their conduct more efficiently. If they were able to do so, the effi-
ciency of national regulatory efforts would similarly improve. Right 
now, judicially developed court-access standards do not align with 
Congress's regulatory priorities.39 
Before court-access standards can be aligned with legislative pri-
orities, however, those standards must be articulated and must be con-
34. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller. 510 U.S. 443, 455, 114 S. Ct. 981, 989, 127 L. Ed. 2d 285 
(1994) ("But to tell the truth. forum non conveniens cannot really be relied upon in making 
decisions about secondary conduct-in deciding, for example, where to sue or where one is 
subject to being sued."). In contrast. the personal jurisdiction doctrine is intended to allow par-
ties to structure their activities as part of the larger due process protection. See, e.g .. World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ("The Due Process Clause ... allows 
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to 
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.''). 
35. See, e.g., Allin C. Seward III, After Bhopal: Implications for Parent Company Liability, 
21 INT'L LAW. 695, 706 (1987) (noting that, for example, the doctrine may cause U.S. corpora-
tions to invest outside the United States, as "[t]he greater the degree of commitment and the 
greater the concentration of resources abroad, the greater the difficulty a U.S. court will have in 
justifying a retention of jurisdiction"); Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine 
In Search of a Role, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1259, 1263 ("[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens has 
outlived its usefulness."). 
36. Andrew R. Klein. Foreign Plaimitfs, Forum non Conveniens, and Consistency. in SE-
LECTED EssAYS oN CuRRENT LEGAL IssuEs 193 (David Frenkel & Carsten Gerner-Beuerle 
eds., 2008). 
37. See Seward, supra note 35, at 706 (making recommendations for avoiding a U.S. forum). 
38. In fact, an in-house attorney for Upjohn wrote an article recommending various busi-
ness measures that U.S. multinationals might take to minimize the risk of being called to defend 
transnational actions in U.S. courts. Id. 
39. See Elizabeth T. Lear. Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Fric-
lion on lhe Frontier of the Inherem Power. 91 IowA L. REv. 1147, 1166 (2006) ("The current 
federal forum non conveniens regime is flatly out of step with a number of congressional regula-
tory decisions .... untold legislative enactments now seek explicitly to regulate extraterritorial 
events."). 
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sistently applied.40 At this time, they are not: while occasionally courts 
and commentators will opine on the relationship between national 
regulatory interests and court access standards, their opinions often 
conflict. As a result, there is widespread confusion about how regula-
tory interests should be aligned with court access, and there is disa-
greement about which nation's regulatory interests should be given 
greater weight, in the forum non conveniens analysis, for resolving 
foreign plaintiffs' product-liability claims involving U.S. products.41 
C. The Perception-and Reality-of Injustice 
The unpredictability of the forum non conveniens doctrine also 
leads to the perception of injustice. On the international level, this 
perception can cause foreign-relations headaches and retaliation.42 
Because the United States has not set a clear court-access policy for 
foreign plaintiffs, and because many civil law nations expect jurisdic-
tion to be proper in the defendants' home forum, the discretionary 
dismissal of foreign plaintiffs' claims may be seen by other nations as 
discriminatory and unjust.43 Some nations have lodged diplomatic 
protests or have passed retaliatory legislation.44 The large civil judg-
40. See infra Part IV. 
41. Compare In re Fosamax Products Liab, Litig., No. 1:06-cv-5087 (JFK). 2009 WL 
3398930, *4 (S.D.N. Y. 2009) ("Pharmaceutical products liability cases involving an allegedly 
unsafe drug that was sold in a foreign country subject to its regulatory scheme, and then later 
ingested by plaintiff in that foreign country, are especially susceptible to forum non conveniens 
dismissal clue to the foreign country's strong interest in the matter. In these cases, the foreign 
nation has an interest in protecting its citizens from alleged injuries caused by events occurring 
within its borders.") (citation omitted) with Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Inju-
ries, and Forum Non Conveniens. 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 559, 562 (2007) ("In the majority of 
international torts claims, forum non conveniens dismissals subvert essential American inter-
ests .... [E]ven in cases brought by foreign plaintiffs injured in foreign countries by globally 
marketed goods, forum non conveniens dismissals undermine critical American interests in 
deterrence."). 
42. See Whytock & Robertson. supra note 18. at 1491-92. 
43. !d.; see also Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, supra note 6, 
at 1083 ("Allowing U.S. judges to cliscretionarily dismiss cases against U.S. corporations contra-
venes this strong sociolegal tradition and gives rise to the criticism that the forum non con-
veniens doctrine operates as a 'tool to escape liability,' denying foreign plaintiffs the advantages 
of the U.S. federal court system.") (quoting RoNALD A. BRAND & Scorr R. JABLONSKI. FoRUM 
NoN CoNVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FuTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CoNVEN-
TION ON CHOICE OF CouRT AGREEMENTS 128, 129 (2007); Louise Weinberg, Insights and lro-
nies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 307, 312 (1985) ("Maintaining the Bhopal 
cases in [U.S.] courts would not violate principles of international comity ... [but in fact] grant-
ing access would be an exercise in comity."). 
44. Letter from Leonidas Plaza Vercluga, Attorney Gen. of Ecuador, to U.S. Attorney Gen. 
Janet Reno (Jan. 15, 1997). available at http:l/www.iaba.org/LLinks_forum_non_Ecuador.htm 
(lodging official complaint that courts have used forum non conveniens doctrine to "close the 
doors of American courts to citizens of my country"). 
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ment Chevron currently faces in Ecuador may be a direct result of 
displeasure with the case's earlier dismissal by a U.S. court.45 
The perception of injustice also matters at the individual level.46 
Foreign plaintiffs may lack a remedy altogether if they cannot pursue 
the case in a U.S. court.47 The perception of injustice may be espe-
cially strong if the plaintiffs manage to win a lawsuit in their home 
country after dismissal from the United States, but are then unable to 
enforce the judgment in the defendant's home country.48 Even when 
the inconsistency is limited to court access in the first instance, incon-
sistent rulings will give rise to a perception of injustice.49 When plain-
tiffs' access to an effective remedy is inconsistent, unpredictable, and 
varies according to seemingly random geographic districts, parties will 
lose trust in the system and in the rule of law more broadly.50 
III. CoNSTRAINING DISCRETION ON APPEAL 
The classic remedy for inconsistent application of the law is ap-
pellate review. Appellate courts-especially the Supreme Court-
"announce, clarify, and harmonize the rules of decisions employed by 
the legal system in which they serve. "51 Appellate review of district 
court decisionmaking fulfills three basic roles in the judicial process: 
45. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 18, at 1447-48. 
46. See Fromherz, supra note 7 ("It is a basic tenet of judicial fairness that similar cases 
ought to receive similar treatment."). 
47. Robertson, supra note 17, at 418-20; Jeff Todd, Phamom Torts and Forum Non Con-
veniens Blocking Sratll/es: Irony and Metonymy in Nicaraguan Special Law 364, 43 U. MIAMI 
lNTER-Alvl L. REv. (forthcoming) (noting that "calls for justice" in transnational cases are often 
"reduced to a mandate for U.S. court trials," as plaintiffs and commentators overlook other 
mechanisms, including settlement programs. that could also offer corrective justice). 
48. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 18, at 1482-83. 
49. While it is true that not all inconsistency arises from unpredictability. even predictable 
inconsistency will give rise to a sense of capricious injustice. Thus, for example. the political 
party of the federal judge's appointing President may help model the likelihood of forum non 
conveniens dismissal. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Fomm Shopping System, 96 
CoRNELL L. REv. 481, 526 (2011) ("Judges nominated by Republicans appear more concerned 
with keeping foreign plaintiffs from forum shopping into the U.S. federal courts than those nom-
inated by Democrats; and, in terms of territorial factors, Republican nominees appear more 
concerned with the place of conduct, and Democratic nominees appear more concerned with the 
place of injury."). But that predictability does nothing to encourage respect for the rule of law. 
50. See Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies in Litigation 
111ith aSpotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial Estoppel, Equitable 
Estoppel, Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, "Mend the Hold," "Fraud on the Court" and Judi-
cial and Evidentiary Admissions, 4 CoNN. Ins. L.J. 589, 733 (1998) ("The doctrines that prevent 
litigants from assuming inconsistent positions protect judicial integrity and ultimately. the pub-
lic's trust in the rule of law."). 
51. PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR, AND MAURICE ROSENBERG. JUSTICE ON 
APPEAL 5 (1976). 
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(1) it increases the probability of a correct judgment; (2) it provides 
greater uniformity of result; and (3) it increases litigants' sense that 
their dispute has been fully and fairly heard and thereby increases re-
spect for the rule of law.52 
At least in the area of forum non conveniens, however, these ben-
efits remain elusive. Part of the problem, as other scholars have sug-
gested, is a lack of clarity about the fundamental role of forum non 
conveniens and the interests it protects. A confounding factor, how-
ever, is the lack of effective appellate review, and, in particular, the 
lack of interlocutory appellate review of decisions denying a forum 
non conveniens motion and retaining jurisdiction. These two factors 
work in tandem. Without greater appellate review-and specifically, 
without interlocutory review of decisions retaining jurisdiction-the 
substantive law of forum access will never be consistent or coherent. 53 
And without greater attention to the substantive law of forum non 
conveniens, appellate courts will continue to offer unhelpful guidance 
in this area in those instances in which a party appeals from a forum 
non conveniens dismissal. 54 
A. Lack of Clarity Regarding the District Court's Procedural 
Discretion 
Interlocutory appellate review is necessary to delimit the scope of 
the district court's discretion, particularly its discretion to retain cases. 
Although forum non conveniens motions are common in transna-
tional litigation, and although nearly half of such motions are denied, 
appellate courts almost never review a district court's decision to re-
tain jurisdiction. While a decision to dismiss is a final judgment that 
52. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A 
Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L REv. 733, 771 (2006). 
53. See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Rede-
fining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REv. 527, 530-31 (2002) (describing a 
"procedural uncoupling" in which ''appellate courts never effectively review many of the most 
controversial rulings and innovations" of trial judges). 
54. See Thomas 0. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REv. 801, 802 (2010) ("[T]he construction of substantive law necessarily entails making assump-
tions about how that law ultimately will be enforced. Many of those assumptions are rooted in 
the procedures pursuant to which a claim to vindicate that law would be litigated. . .. This 
contextualization of substantive law within a procedural framework will be subconscious when 
not deliberate."). 
p 
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can be reversed for abuse of discretion,55 a decision refusing to dismiss 
is not a final order and is not immediately appealable as of right. 56 
Theoretically, the issue may still be decided after a trial on the 
merits, but it rarely is. 57 By that time, many of the factors in the forum 
non conveniens analysis will have become moot: whatever the balance 
of conveniences was before trial, it is no longer the same once a trial 
has been held. Retrying the case is itself highly inconvenient.58 Con-
sequently, remanding the case for retrial in a more convenient forum 
would only add to the overall expense and delay of the case.59 
As a result, a district judge's decision to retain a case is almost 
never overruled, even when that decision is inconsistent with other 
courts' rulings. This unconstrained discretion explains a great deal of 
the doctrine's lack of predictability, as it allows the creation of un-
resolvable intercircuit and intracircuit conflicts in the application of 
forum non conveniens law.60 In this sense, the district court's discre-
tion can be described as "review-limiting" discretion to retain cases-
that is, "there may be law constraining the trial court's decision, but 
there will be [almost] no appellate review of that decision. "61 Such 
discretion 'gives the tlial judge a right to be wrong without incurling 
reversal.' "62 
It is less clear, however, whether the district court judge would be 
acting within permissible discretion to retain a case under these cir-
cumstances.Can the judge be said to err if he or she chooses to keep a 
55. See, e.g., Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007) (re-
viewing a forum non conveniens dismissal). 
56. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988). Interlocutory review may be 
available by mandamus in exceptional cases or through 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) if both the district 
court and the court of appeals agree to such review. 
57. Christina Melady Morin, Note, Review and Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens and 
Venue Transfer Orders, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 715, 728-29 (1991) ("[C]ourts are unwilling to 
review meaningfully forum convenience orders after final judgment."). 
58. Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, supra note 6, at 1097-99; 
see Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc., 335 F.3d 633, 643 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The fact that the district 
court tried this case to a conclusion indicates that Zelinski's forum of choice was, if not conve-
nient for Columbia, at least workable. Furthermore, at this point the public interest certainly 
would not be well-served by deciding to jettison the untold hours of work put into this case 
... . ");see also Demenus v. Tinton 35, Inc., 873 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that a forum 
non conveniens motion 'fails to survive the mooting effect of the actual litigation of the suit in 
the putative inconvenient forum'); but see Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 881 
(5th Cir. 1987) (reversing even after trial on the merits). 
59. Zelinski, 335 F.3d at 643. 
60. See supra Part III. 
61. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TuL. L. REv. 157, 202 (2008) 
(quoting Maurice Rosenberg. Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYR-
ACUSE L. REv. 635, 638 (1971)). 
62. Jd. 
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case wben the public and private interest factors might actually sup-
port dismissal? This type of discretion is called "decision-liberating" 
discretion, because the judge possesses the freedom to retain a case 
even when the factors would easily permit dismissal, and is "free to 
render the decision it chooses. "63 
Historically, the forum non conveniens doctrine was likely viewed 
as "decision liberating." If the factors were met, the court could 
choose either to dismiss or retain the case. Such decision-liberating 
discretion is consistent with the traditional view of the doctrine as a 
matter of convenience and docket protection, because the district 
court judge is in the best position to consider the administrative im-
pact of retaining the case. In addition, the Supreme Court's typical 
phrasing of the forum non conveniens doctrine sounds permissive, 
rather than mandatory: it states that "a federal court has discretion to 
dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens 'when an alter-
native forum has jurisdiction to hear [the] case, and ... trial in the 
chosen forum would establish ... oppressiveness and vexation to a 
defendant ... out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience, or ... 
the chosen forum [is) inappropriate because of considerations affect-
ing the court's own administrative and legal problems."'64 
The view that judges should have full discretion to retain a case 
may be changing over time, however. Federal courts have been will-
ing, on occasion, to review interlocutory orders retaining jurisdiction. 
In at least one recent case, the appellate court ordered the district 
court to dismiss based on the weight of the factors pointing toward 
dismissal.65 And while Congress has not yet clarified the federal doc-
trine, at least one state has amended its forum non conveniens statute 
to move from a permissive statute to one that mandates dismissal 
when the factors are satisfied.66 
Courts also seem to be attaching more precedential weight to ear-
lier forum non conveniens decisions, a practice which also suggests 
that the forum non conveniens decision is not entirely a matter of 
case-by-case discretion. The traditional view of forum non conveniens 
63. !d. (quoting Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from 
Above. 22 SYRACUSE L REv. 635, 638 (1971)). 
64. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429 (2007). 
65. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 392 
n.10 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno 'A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 881 (5th Cir. 
1987). 
66. See In re Gen. Elec. Co., 271 S.W.3d 681, 685-87 (Tex. 2008) (noting that the Texas 
legislature had amended the forum non conveniens statute to provide that the district judge 
"'shall" dismiss when the factors are met, whereas the prior statute had provided that the judge 
"may" dismiss). 
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left no room for preclusion; each case possessed a unique mix of the 
public and private interest factors, and therefore each case would re-
quire a fresh analysis.67 More recently, however, some appellate 
courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have been willing to assume that 
broad factors can limit the need to undertake such discretionary anal-
ysis.68 If for example, one tire rollover case may be appropriately tried 
in Latin America, then other cases will be bound by that decision even 
if they involve different claims and potentially different forum coun-
tries.69 If such decisions are indeed binding in subsequent cases, then 
the district judge cannot possess full discretion to retain a case when 
the interest factors would otherwise weigh in favor of dismissal. 
These questions are unsettled because the scope of the district 
court's authority to retain a case cannot be determined without effec-
tive interlocutory review.70 When the decision to retain a case is al-
most impervious to the appellate process, then it is impossible to 
determine whether that authority exists. Because the district judge's 
decision is protected by review-limiting discretion, it is impossible to 
know whether the judge also possesses decision-liberating discretion. 
B. Lack of Clarity Regarding the Substantive Interests Protected 
Intertwined with the problem of limited appellate review is the 
need to identify what substantive interests the forum non conveniens 
doctrine should protect. Because the protected interests are not 
clearly identified, courts do not know what standards to apply on ap-
peal. At the same time, however, because decisions to retain jurisdic-
tion cannot be effectively reviewed at this time, appellate courts 
cannot effectively "announce, clarify, and harmonize" the interests 
protected by the doctrine.71 
67. Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672,682-83 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (noting that the 
different location of tire manufacturer and the fact that "the suit involved traffic accidents in 
Colombia, not Mexico" made plaintiffs' reliance on the earlier case "problematic"). 
68. See See Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co. 662 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2011), in which 
the court criticized one of the attorneys for failing to disclose "apparently dispositive precedent". 
However, the "dispositive precedent" involved a different forum country, Argentina, rather than 
Mexico. Additionally, Mexican courts, unlike their Argentinian counterparts, had ruled that 
Mexico lacked jurisdiction over the defendants. See Joe Palazzolo. Who's the Ostrich?, WALL ST. 
J. LAw BLoG, Nov. 28, 2011 at http:/lblogs.wsj.com/law/2011/11/28/whos-the-ostrich/ ("Not only 
is it on a different continent, the record we presented had no fewer than ten cases dismissed by 
Mexican courts proving that Mexico does not have any jurisdiction over foreign defendants."). 
69. See Gonzalez-Servin. 662 F.3d at 934. 
70. See supra notes 55 - 62. 
71. See supra note 51. 
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One of the first issues to be decided is whether the doctrine is 
intended only to avoid trial in a highly inconvenient forum (the "op-
pressive and vexatious"72 view), or whether it is also intended to di-
rect cases into the most convenient forum (the "most suitable 
forum" 73 view). There is support for both points of view in current 
U.S. caselaw/4 and there is also support for both points of view in the 
practice of other countries. 75 If the goal is only to avoid an oppres-
sively inconvenient forum, then appellate review of decisions to retain 
jurisdiction will rarely be necessary; the district court knows its docket 
and can predict how difficult it will be to try the case. No other court 
is in a better position to determine whether the case is vexatious, and 
no court has more of an incentive to quickly dispose of truly vexatious 
cases.76 
On the other hand, however, if the United States has in fact 
moved closer to the "most suitable forum" test, then there is a need 
for appellate review of decisions denying forum non conveniens deci-
sions. When the question becomes a comparative one-which forum 
is better suited to hear the case, which forum has a greater interest in 
the case, which forum could resolve the case most efficiently-then 
additional review is warranted. At that point, the question is not just 
discretion. It is, instead, a question of discretion bounded by questions 
of law, bounded by the interpretation of each of the public and private 
interest factors and constrained by the weight given to each of them in 
a particular context. While there would still be room for the district 
72. See BRAND & JABLONSKr, supra note 43, at 11. 
73. !d. at 14. 
74. Compare Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the 
test is "whether defendants have made a clear showing of facts which establish such oppression 
and vexation of a defendant as to be out of proportion to plaintiff's convenience, which may be 
shown to be slight or nonexistent" and providing that "(f]orum non conveniens is an exceptional 
tool to be employed sparingly, not a doctrine that compels plaintiffs to choose the optimal forum 
for their claim") with Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1401 (8th Cir. 1991) ("The 'ultimate 
inquiry' in a forum non conveniens analysis is where the place of trial will 'best serve the conve-
nience of the parties and the ends of justice.'") (citing Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 
u.s. 518, 527 (1947)). 
75. BRAND & JABLONSKr, supra note 43, at 87 (noting that Australia has maintained the 
"vexation and oppression" test, while Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom have 
generally moved closer to a "most appropriate forum" standard). 
76. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Etv!ORY L.J. 747, 754 (1982) 
("(I]n these days of crowded dockets there is an inevitable risk of some degree of subconscious 
bias when the decision whether to dismiss a case because of forum non conveniens is made by 
the judge who will have to try it if the motion is denied."). 
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court to exercise discretion, that discretion would be substantially 
more constrained. 77 
Finally, there is also the question of what interests, in addition to 
litigation convenience, are protected by the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. Although the doctrine was founded on the idea of conve-
nience, most commentators agree that the doctrine has expanded sig-
nificantly from that original purpose. For one thing, the number of 
forum non conveniens dismissals has been growing78 just as modern 
technology reduces the inconvenience of litigation in U.S. courts.79 As 
one recent judicial opinion stated, the doctrine is now assumed to pro-
tect an interest "considerably broader than the colloquial understand-
ing of the word 'convenient,' which may be one reason why the phrase 
forum non conveniens is best rendered in Latin. "80 The scope of this 
interest, however, "rests on unarticulated and unexamined substantive 
assumptions. "81 
Because these assumptions are unstated and merely implicit, ap-
pellate courts struggle to articulate reasons to affirm or reverse district 
court judgments dismissing cases for forum non conveniens. Some 
cases explicitly take into account considerations not easily made part 
of the public or private interest factors, such as a foreign sovereign's 
interest in applying its own damage caps.82 Other courts implicitly de-
fer to U.S. economic interests by applying a stricter review of cases 
brought by foreign plaintiffs against U.S. corporate defendants.83 
The difficulty in clarifying the protected interests is heightened by 
the difference between the parties' objectives and the doctrine's stated 
purpose. For the parties, what matters is the ultimate recovery: plain-
77. See Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of 
Judgment. 64 U. MIAMI L. REv. 947, 952 (2010) (defining discretion as "authority to choose 
within a range of possible legitimate outcomes." bounded by the "range of legitimate substantive 
outcomes."). When the range of legitimate substantive outcomes is restricted by principles of 
law, then discretion will necessarily be more limited. 
78. See supra note 14. 
79. See Martin Davies, The Impact of Digital Technology on Forwn Non Conveniens in 
lmemational Litigation, TULANE LAw., Spring/Summer 2002 available at http://www.law.tulane. 
edu/uploadedfiles/faculty/notebook_davies.pdf. 
80. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 392 
n.lO (2d Cir. 2011). 
81. GARY B. BoRN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES CouRTS 369 (4th ed. 2007). 
82. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 392 
n.lO (2d Cir. 2011). 
83. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CoRNELL L. 
REv. 481. 526 (2011) (noting that some judges "appear more concerned with keeping foreign 
plaintiffs from forum shopping into the U.S. federal courts"'). 
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tiffs want access to U.S. courts when they believe it will maximize 
their chance of financial recovery, and defendants want dismissal from 
the U.S. when they believe that recovery will be lessened-or nonexis-
tent-elsewhere. Thus, what the parties are really litigating about is 
different from what the doctrine ostensibly protects. 84 
The tension between party goals and doctrinal purpose is further 
exacerbated by a shift in the doctrine's application from domestic 
cases to transnational ones. When the doctrine was first applied in 
United States courts many decades ago as a way of identifying a con-
venient forum for domestic litigants, it really was about convenience, 
both for the parties and for the courts. While there may have been 
some difference in recovery based on state choice-of-law rules, these 
state-by-state differences were much smaller than the transnational 
differences that exist today. Because the doctrine was supplanted by a 
statutory transfer of venue system for domestic litigation in federal 
courts, however, it no longer applies in purely domestic litigation.85 As 
result, the doctrine is now applied almost exclusively in transnational 
cases, but does not-at least not yet-account for the transnational 
concerns of comity, foreign relations, or competing sovereign 
interests. 86 
C. Varying Levels of Scrutiny 
When forum non conveniens cases (typically dismissals, as noted 
above87) are reviewed on appeal, courts will apply varying levels of 
scrutiny. The Supreme Court has held that appellate courts should re-
view the district court's forum non conveniens decision for abuse of 
84. See BoRN & RuTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 396 (comparing the motion to ·'teenagers on 
their first date, conscientiously talking about everything except what is on their minds"). 
85. See Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp .. 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) 
("The common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens has continuing application [in federal 
courts] only in cases where the alternative forum is abroad, and perhaps in rare instances where 
a state or territorial court serves litigational convenience best. For the federal court system, 
Congress has codified the doctrine and has provided for transfer, rather than dismissal, when a 
sister federal court is the more convenient place for trial of the action.'') (quoting American 
Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994); other citations omitted). 
86. This failure to account for international interests is representative of transnational liti-
gation in United States courts more generally. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation 
a Distinct Field? The Persistence of Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J 
lNT'L L. 301, 305 (2008) ("When American courts are confronted with disputes with a transna-
tional dimension, they reach for a familiar toolbox-one with tools for fixing domestic problems. 
They extrapolate from their experience with familiar domestic litigation. especially interstate 
litigation."). 
87. See supra Part liLA. 
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discretion, which is a highly deferential standard of review.88 When 
the district court "has considered all relevant public and private inter-
est factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable" the 
appellate court should give that decision "substantial deference."89 
Even here, however, there is room for disagreement and differing in-
terpretations. Some appellate courts will conclude that the district 
court abused its discretion in dismissing a case even when it consid-
ered each of the relevant factors, but simply gave a different weight to 
the facts presented; for these courts, the fact that the appellate court 
would give different weights to the factors in a particular case is 
enough to find an abuse of discretion.90 Other appellate courts will 
reverse only if they conclude that the district court made an error of 
law in applying the factors; these courts will remand for the district 
court to re-weigh the public and private interest factors. 91 
Finally, some courts may agree with the more deferential stan-
dard in theory but may apply a stricter level of review in practice. The 
Third Circuit, for example, once remanded a case to allow the district 
court to re-weigh the factors, but vacated the district court's order a 
second time when it again concluded that the factors supported dis-
missal.92 In the appellate court's second opinion, its mandate specified 
that the district court should not re-weigh the forum non conveniens 
factors; instead, the appellate court was "remand[ing] so that discov-
ery and trial can proceed."93 
88. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) ("The forum non conveniens 
determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only 
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion .... "). 
89. !d. 
90. See, e.g., Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1401 (8th Cir. 1991) ("We conclude that 
the district court erred in granting a dismissal based on forum non conveniens. Proper deference 
to the plaintiff's forum choice, where the defendants reside, coupled with the proper weighing of 
the Gilbert factors, requires reversal."); Boston Telecomm's Grp., Inc. v. Wood, 588 F.3d 1201. 
1210 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Here, the district court abused its discretion in holding that this private 
interest factor was neutral when Wood provided very little information that would have enabled 
the district court to understand why various witnesses were material to his defense."). 
91. See, e.g., Wilson v. Island Seas Inv's, Ltd., 590 F.3d 1264, 1273 (11th Cir. 2009) ("This is 
not to say, of course, that the district court cannot again determine that the case should be tried 
in the Bahamas after further development of the factual record and further consideration of the 
private interests as directed by this opinion.). 
92. Lony v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 935 F.2d 604, 615 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[W]e con-
clude once again that in light of the balance of private and public interest factors as we have 
outlined above, in addition to the extent of merits proceedings already underway, the district 
court abused its discretion in dismissing Lony's complaint on the grounds of forum non 
conveniens'"). 
93. /d. 
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Scholars have recommended trying to standardize the appellate 
scrutiny given on appeal, recommending that scrutiny be raised either 
to a "de novo" standard94 or to an "abuse of discretion plus" stan-
dard.95 A more rigorous appellate analysis is certainly warranted, but 
such a rigorous analysis would be almost impossible to implement 
without also regularly permitting interlocutory review. Adopting a 
more rigorous standard of review, but reviewing only the cases that 
get dismissed, means reversing more decisions to dismiss without simi-
larly scrutinizing decisions to retain jurisdiction. Such a lopsided ap-
pellate review would still leave significant issues unresolved, so that 
questions like the scope of the district judge's discretion to retain 
cases and the nature of the interests protected by forum non con-
veniens would continue to escape clarification. As a result, stricter 
(but unbalanced) appellate review would have a perverse effect: it 
would provide extra scrutiny of only one-half of the equation, and 
would therefore offer a false sense of accuracy while doing nothing to 
resolve the basic inconsistencies of the doctrine. Doctrinal clarity can 
be achieved only by combining such added scrutiny with a robust in-
terlocutory appeal process. 
IV. THE RoAD FoRWARD 
The forum non conveniens doctrine is not the only doctrine to 
suffer a mismatch between the procedures applied at the district court 
level and the ability of appellate courts to scrutinize those procedures. 
Scholars have referred to this phenomenon as "procedural uncou-
pling."96 Expanded interlocutory review is frequently recommended 
as a solution to establish consistency and align policy choices with liti-
gation realities. 97 
94. See Klein, supra note 7; William L Reynolds, The Proper Forum for a Suit: Transna-
tional Forum Non Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. 
REv. 1663, 1688 (1992) ("Because the forum non conveniens motion has such a significant im-
pact on the litigation, the standard of review should be nondeferential. and expressly so, despite 
the costs. The trial court's ruling below can easily be treated as it normally would be treated-as 
a question of law subject to de novo review."). 
95. From/zerz, supra note 7. 
96. See Waters, supra note 53, at 530; Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences 
of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wrs. L REv. 631, 640-41 (1994) ("Nineteenth-century civil proce-
dure grew from a tight connection between trial and appellate court procedure. Both developed 
in tandem. Trial courts began to regulate trials more elaborately, and appellate courts kept pace, 
creating new procedures and scrutinizing trial courts' use of them. Today the two tiers have 
become uncoupled. Trial courts work with ever-more-elaborate procedural tools, but appellate 
courts have not correspondingly increased their supervisory powers."). 
97. See Waters, supra note 53, at 585-86 ("To address adequately the problem of procedural 
uncoupling, an interlocutory review device must enable appellate courts to intervene in any of 
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It was just this disconnect that led to the adoption of an expanded 
interlocutory review rule for decisions granting or denying class certi-
fication.98 And class certification is a good analogue to the forum non 
conveniens dilemma: as other scholars have noted, both types of deci-
sions, though nominatively procedural, may be effectively dispositive 
for the parties who therefore battle fervently over the issue.99 Appel-
late courts have in fact taken advantage of their expanded power of 
interlocutory review, and have significantly increased the reversal rate 
of class-certification decisions. 100 
A. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Appellate Review 
Of course, there are counterarguments to expanding appellate re-
view. First, the expansion of appellate review increases the costs of 
litigation. Specifically, allowing defendants to appeal the district 
court's decision to retain a case causes delays for the plaintiffs, who 
must wait longer to get to trial. If the plaintiffs lack litigation re-
sources, this delay can present a significant hardship and can reduce 
the settlement value even of a meritorious claim.101 Second, it is rea-
sonable to question whether these higher costs are worth incurring 
when there is already some appellate review of forum non conveniens 
decisions-specifically, review of those cases dismissed at the district 
court leveJ.l 02 Unlike class-certification decisions, where neither the 
decision to grant nor the decision to deny was previously appealable, 
approximately half of all forum non conveniens decisions are dismis-
sals and therefore qualify as appealable final judgments.103 
While these costs are not insignificant, I argue that appellate re-
view is nevertheless warranted. First, the uncertainty over forum 
these areas in order to provide guidance to trial courts and to participate in the development of 
new substantive or procedural law."'). 
98. ld. at 586. 
99. Fromherz. supra note 7, at 17-20. 
100. !d. at 24-25. 
101. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 
SYRAcusE L. REv. 635, 662 (1971) (noting that delay for interlocutory appeal allows "the party 
with the deeper pocket" to wear down the opposing party "by challenging every uncongenial 
ruling. whether made in the pleading, discovery, trial or post-trial phases of the litigation"); see 
also Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on Transnational Litiga-
tion. 44 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1966202 ("Plaintiffs without available cash on hand cannot always afford 
to file suits even when the expected payment would make such a suit economically worthwhile; if 
they do not have cash on hand to pay litigation costs, they cannot file suit even when the ex-
pected recovery significantly outweighs litigation costs."). 
102. See supra Part III. 
103. See supra note 30. 
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choice may well create higher litigation costs than would an increase 
in interlocutory appeals. Because litigants cannot reliably predict 
whether the district court will retain the case, they must litigate ques-
tions of forum choice in nearly every transnational case, and they 
must reargue those questions on appeal if the case is dismissed. 104 Ex-
panding the use of interlocutory appeals would increase litigation 
costs in the short term, but would likely minimize the total amount of 
litigation over forum choice in the long term, as the circuit courts offer 
more guidelines for the district courts to follow and thereby reduce 
the need to argue these questions in future cases. 
Second, while it is true that there is currently review of forum non 
conveniens dismissals, this limited review may create more problems 
than it solves. Because only dismissals are now reviewed, the cases 
that reach the circuit courts are a biased sample. Appellate courts can-
not reach the essential questions regarding the scope of the district 
judge's discretion because the courts cannot' reliably review cases in 
which the district court exercised that discretion to retain a case. In-
stead, they can review only cases where the judge exercised discretion 
to dismiss it. 105 As a result, the appellate courts cannot apply a co her-
ent theory of forum non conveniens that encompasses the full range of 
the trial judge's discretion. 106 Without such a coherent theory to sus-
tain the forum non conveniens review, even review of dismissals will 
necessarily be haphazard and unpredictable. 107 
Finally, even if expanding appellate rights did increase litigation 
costs overall, the higher cost may still be justified by increasing trust in 
the justice system and respect for the rule of law. As others have 
noted, plaintiffs who are able to "secure a dramatically different out-
come simply by choosing a certain court," make the legal system ap-
pear to be "arbitrary and unconcerned with administering 
fundamental justice. "108 Over the long term, these apparently arbi-
trary decisions can erode respect for the legal system and diminish 
public confidence in the judiciary. 109 
The costs of uncertainty, the problems with one-sided review, and 
the arbitrary appearance of current decisions therefore support 
104. See supra Part II.A. 
105. See supra Part III.A. 
106. See supra Part III.B. 
107. ld. 
108. Daniel J. Dorward, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial Protection of 
Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L.141, 152 
(1998). 
109. ld. 
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greater interlocutory review of forum non conveniens decisions. The 
costs of expanded appeal remain relevant, however, and should be 
taken into account in developing procedures for review. The next 
subsection addresses potential ways to expand appellate review while 
still minimizing cost and inconvenience. 
B. Options for Expanding Appellate Review 
The available framework for expanding interlocutory review con-
sists of a complex web of appellate remedies.U0 There are three po-
tential ways to increase the availability of interlocutory appeals: (1) 
Congress could adopt a forum non conveniens statute that includes 
appellate remedies;m (2) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could 
be amended to allow for interlocutory review;112 or (3) courts could 
certify more cases for interlocutory review on a piecemeal basis, with 
mandamus remedies available in extreme cases.113 These options are 
presented in order of their desirability, but in reverse order of their 
ease of adoption. Any of these options, however, would represent pro-
gress in aligning the doctrinal goals and litigation practices of court-
access decisions. 
1. Creating a Statutory Framework 
Because the unpredictability of the forum non conveniens doc-
trine is composed of intertwined procedural and substantive ques-
110. See Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdicfion. 48 B.C. L. REv. 1237, 1227 
(2007) ("Appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory trial court rulings is among the most trouble-
some issues in civil procedure."); Robertson, Appellme Review of Disco\'e'J' Orders, supra note 
62, at 786 (noting that "[t]he current approaches to interlocutory review" are ... " haphazard"); 
see also Rory Ryan, Luke Meier, & Jeremy Counseller.InterloClttol:v Review of Orders Denying 
Remand Motions, 63 BAYLOR L. REv. 734, 737-59 (2011) (articulating the complex relationship 
of interlocutory review and mandamus). 
111. See AndrewS. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1643, 1655 (2011) (noting that Congress has not 
used this power in the last few decades, but has instead "play[ed] hot potato over the issue" by 
vesting power in the Supreme Court to enact such exceptions in its rulemaking process). 
112. 28 U.S.C. §1292(e) (2006) ("The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with 
section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of 
appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b). (c), or (d)."). 
113. 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) (2006) ("When a district judge, ... shall be of the opinion that such 
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference 
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate 
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals 
which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon. in its discretion, per-
mit an appeal to be taken from such order .... "). Review under the Cohen collateral order 
doctrine is unavailable to review a decision not to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens 
grounds. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517. 529 (1988). 
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tions, Congress is best positioned to resolve the current 
inconsistencies. By implementing a new statutory framework that sets 
out both the substantive choices shaping court-access policy and the 
procedural mechanisms needed to protect those policy choices, Con-
gress could better account for the relevant policy interests affected by 
court-access doctrine. Specifically, it could weigh comparative sover-
eign interests, foreign relations, and economic realities. 114 Legislation 
by Congress would uniquely be able to combine these substantive pol-
icies with procedural requirements, ensuring that the forum non con-
veniens determination aligned with economic and political realities. 
Of course, it is difficult to predict just how Congress would balance 
competing policy choices; nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere, 
the stability gained from enacting such a statute is likely to be benefi-
cial regardless of whether the statute narrows or expands court access 
in transnational cases.U5 
However, while such a statute would be beneficial, it is unlikely 
to be available in the near term. As Professor James Pfander has 
noted, "[a ]part from imperfect foresight, Congress suffers from an-
other shortcoming as a jurisdiction-managing institution-lack of in-
terest."116 Creating a set of coherent rules for forum non conveniens 
motions is simply not likely to be a high priority for the average 
legislator. 117 
2. Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
If Congress is unlikely to adopt a full forum non conveniens stat-
ute, action by judicial rulemakers offers a close second-best option. 
Authority already exists for this action: Congress has statutorily dele-
gated rulemaking power over the expansion of interlocutory re-
114. See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity As Conflict: Resituating International Comity As 
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAvrs L. REv. 11, 78 (2010) ("Until such a time that Congress pro-
vides direction for comity cases, courts should resist the call to create judicial doctrines of ab-
stention that tramp on sovereign interests. especially when such invocations of the doctrine do 
not explicitly take account of the direct sovereign interests a court's decision implicates."); Rob-
ertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, supra note 6, at 1120-21. 
115. See Robertson, supra note 6. 
116. James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supen,isory 
Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. P A. L. REv. 493, 534 (2011). 
117. !d. ("Interest groups may press for public expenditures, such as the repair of roads and 
bridges, but they are unlikely to press for jurisdictional repairs. The combined absence of inter-
est group support and, dare I say it, intrinsic interest, can sometimes consign jurisdictional re-
form to legislative limbo."). 
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view.118 It is true that this process lacks the ability to make the kind of 
substantive policy choices that Congress could create in a comprehen-
sive statute. Nonetheless, there are two important advantages to 
rulemaking process: expertise and interest. 119 While questions of liti-
gation procedure and jurisdiction may not be high priorities for Con-
gress members, they are paramount for the litigators, judges, and law 
professors who would likely be heavily involved in the drafting 
process.120 
If the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to allow 
interlocutory review, the rule drafters would have to decide whether 
that review would be mandatory or discretionary-would the defen-
dant be able to appeal the denial of a forum non conveniens motion as 
of right, or would the appellate court be able to decline the appeal?121 
Mandatory jurisdiction would create greater consistency.122 On the 
other hand, however, mandatory review creates significant costs that 
may not be necessary: even discretionary review is likely to increase 
review and therefore improve the consistency of forum non con-
veniens determinations. For example, when the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were amended to allow interlocutory review of class-certifi-
cation decisions, appellate review increased substantially.123 In addi-
tion, discretion can allow courts to consider "case-specific 
information," such as how the additional delay would affect the indi-
vidual equities in a particular case.124 
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006) ("The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance 
with section 2072 of this title. to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts 
of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d)."). 
119. See Pfander, supra note 116, at 537; see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. 
Ct. 599, 609, 175 L. Ed. 2d 458 (2009) ("[T]he rulemaking process has important virtues. It draws 
on the collective experience of bench and bar. see 28 U.S.C. § 2073, and it facilitates the adop-
tion of measured, practical solutions."). 
120. I d. ("As for expertise, committees of the Judicial Conference draw their members from 
the ranks of the state and federal judiciaries, as well as from the practicing bar. When the judges 
feel that they lack the expertise to construct an effective set of rules, they have turned to law 
professor consultants to assist with the work at hand."). 
121. See Pollis. supra note 111 at 1659 ("We want courts to accept appeals from interlocutory 
orders that raise a "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence," but we do not want to burden 
them by requiring them to hear appeals from orders that do not."). 
122. Id. at 1662 ("A discretionary system is too vulnerable to the whims and prejudices of 
individual judges who deny discretionary appeals in cases they wish to avoid and have no obliga-
tion to justify or explain why they do so."). 
123. Id. at 1657-58 ("While class-certification orders were sometimes reviewed under an ap-
pellate court's mandamus power or under§ 1292(b), the promulgation of Rule 23(f) reflected 
the prevailing view that these avenues were often inadequate."): Fromherz. supra note 7, at 17-
20. 
124. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide: How Appellate Procedure Dis-
tributes the Costs of Legal Change, 96 CoRNELL L. REv. 203, 249 (2011) ("Delay might be espe-
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Thus, it may make sense to increase review on a piecemeal basis 
by starting with a rule allowing discretionary review of orders denying 
forum non conveniens dismissal. Such discretionary review may be 
sufficient to allow appellate courts to "identify the kinds of errors at 
the district court level that require appellate correction"125 and 
thereby increase consistency and predictability. If a discretionary rule 
proves inadequate and appellate courts fail to exercise their discre-
tionary review power, the rule could later be amended to allow an 
appeal as of right. 
3. Ad Hoc Discretionary Review 
Even without amending current rules or statutes, the appellate 
courts could elect to increase interlocutory review of forum non con-
veniens decisions on an ad hoc basis. There are two vehicles by which 
the courts can do so: certifying an interlocutory appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b) or granting a petition for writ of mandamus.126 While 
both vehicles are currently available-and are occasionally used tore-
view the denial of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens127-
they are unlikely to provide a sufficient vehicle to secure predictability 
in transnational litigation unless courts substantially increase their use. 
At this time, both remedies are only rarely applied in forum non 
conveniens cases. First, certification requires that the district court 
find that there is a "controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion." This can be a difficult 
requirement to meet: in forum non conveniens cases the dispositive 
question likely involves how much weight to give to particular fac-
tors-in other words, the dispute is more likely to involve the applica-
tion of law to particular facts, rather than a pure question of law. 128 
cially problematic in ligl1t of the equities of a given case .... We want courts to have some 
discretion because we want to harness this sort of case-specific information."). 
125. Pfander. supra note 116, at 541 (discussing discretionary review in the context of re-
mand orders). 
126. See Pollis, supra note 111, at 1657 (explaining both mechanisms). 
127. Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, No. 09-3925-CV 
L, 2011 WL 6188497 (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 2011) (applying§ 1292(b)); In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 
406, 415 (5th Cir. 2009) (providing mandamus relief). 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 19-28; bill see Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as 
First Responders: The Constitutionality and Propriety of Appellate Courts' Resolving Issues in the 
First Instance, 87 NoTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1911455 ("One might ask whether the line between questions of law on the one hand, 
and questions of fact and 'mixed questions' of law and fact, on the other, is a tenable one. The 
slipperiness of the slope between questions of law and mixed questions of law is notorious 
.... "). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that 1292(b) remains available to address 
discovery orders on an interlocutory basis, and discovery orders similarly involve applications of 
... 
l 
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Second, even if the dispute is interpreted to be a question of law, the 
district judge must find that "an immediate appeal from the order may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."129 Due 
to the inherent delay caused by interlocutory appeals, district court 
judges may reasonably conclude that such delay would not speed reso-
lution of the case. After all, the problems caused by the lack of inter-
locutory review are not necessarily problematic in any particular case. 
Rather, the lack of review causes systemic problems when similar 
cases reach conflicting outcomes and thereby create a chaotic system 
overall.130 Such systemic conflict is possible even if each case's resolu-
tion, considered individually, is not unreasonable. Finally, even if the 
district court agrees to certify the case, the circuit court must agree to 
hear it; the appellate court is not required to accept the appeal. 131 
Mandamus review is also quite limited.132 Appellate courts gener-
ally have the power to review district court orders through the exer-
cise of the writ of mandamus, which "compel[ s] a lower court ... to 
perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly. "133 The 
power to issue a writ of mandamus comes from the All Writs Act, 
which provides that "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established 
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and princi-
ples of law."134 As a result, mandamus can function "as akin to an 
interlocutory appeal, a means to procure interlocutory review of a dis-
trict court order. "135 However, the Supreme Court has emphasized 
that mandamus review is available only as a last resort in exceptional 
cases; it is not a substitute for traditional appellate remedies.136 As a 
the law to particular facts. See Mohawk Indus .. Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 607 (2009) 
("The preconditions for§ 1292(b) review-"a controlling question of law," the prompt resolu-
tion of which "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation"-are most 
likely to be satisfied when a privilege ruling involves a new legal question or is of special conse-
quence, and district courts should not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal in such cases."). 
129. 28 u.s.c. § 1292(b) (2006). 
130. See supra Part II. 
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) ("The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an 
appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such 
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order."). 
132. See Robertson. supra note 62, at 750. 
133. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (7th ed. 1999). 
134. 28 u.s.c. § 1651 (2006). 
135. Leah Epstein, Comment, A Balanced Approach to Mandamus Review of Allomey Dis-
qualification Orders, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 667, 678 (2005). 
136. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367.380 (2004) (quoting Will v. United States. 
389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) and Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland. 346 U.S. 379. 383 (1953)) (pro-
viding that mandamus is an "extraordinary remedy," to be used in "only exceptional circum-
stances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power,' or a 'clear abuse of discretion.'"). 
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result, courts have been reluctant to grant mandamus relief in forum 
. 137 non convemens cases. 
Given the limitations of certification and mandamus review, this 
type of ad hoc appellate review is unlikely to solve the predictability 
problems in forum non conveniens review. A statutory fix or rule 
change would be vastly preferable. Nevertheless, the ad hoc tools do 
have one advantage: they are at least potentially available to courts 
now, even though they are underutilized. These mechanisms may 
prove to be more useful if parties are able to persuade individual 
courts that the systemic unpredictability problems in forum non con-
veniens cases warrant an increased reliance on appellate review mech-
anisms. If courts are willing to accept the inefficiencies of 
interlocutory review in enough individual cases, they may be able to 
reduce the overall systemic inefficiency in forum non conveniens 
cases. In order to do so, however, courts must be willing to look be-
yond the short-term costs in favor of long-term benefit. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
Court-access doctrine in transnational litigation is plagued by un-
certainty. Judges possess largely unreviewable discretion in ruling on 
forum non conveniens motions, and courts often come to inconsistent 
decisions on very similar facts. As a result, the law underlying the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine remains unsettled, increasing systemic 
inefficiency both in litigation procedure and in regulatory policy. 
Expanded interlocutory review would help increase consistency 
and align policy choices with litigation realities. Ideally, Congress 
should adopt a comprehensive forum non conveniens statute that 
weighs the competing policy goals such as comparative sovereign in-
terests, foreign relations, and economic realities, and creates a court-
access procedure that accounts for these interests. Political realities 
may make such legislation unlikely, however. A close second-best op-
tion is to proceed through the rulemaking process: an amendment to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that authorizes discretionary ap-
peal of the denial of forum non conveniens motions could still go a 
long way toward minimizing the costs of systemic uncertainty. Finally, 
137. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., BridgestonefFirestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 344 F.3d 648, 
651 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A writ of mandamus may issue only if the challenged order is effectively 
unreviewable at the end of the case, it inflicts irreparable harm, and it 'so far exceed( s J the 
proper bounds of judicial discretion as to be legitimately considered usurpative in character, or 
in violation of a clear and indisputable legal right, or, at the very least, patently erroneous.' By 
their nature, forum non conveniens decisions are ill-suited to this remedy.") (quoting In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 FJd 1293, 1295 (7th Cir.l995)). 
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until such a statutory or rule change takes effect, parties should urge 
courts to apply current ad hoc discretionary review procedures 
broadly. Although these procedures may increase cost and delay in 
individual cases, they are likely to increase systemic efficiency over 
the long run. 
